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Compositional Methods for Information-Hiding[†]

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Systems concerned with information hiding often use randomization to obfuscate the link between the observables and the information to be protected. The degree of protection provided by a system can be expressed in terms of the probability of error associated with the inference of the secret information. We consider a probabilistic process calculus to specify such systems, and we study how the operators affect the probability of error. In particular, we characterize constructs that have the property of not decreasing the degree of protection, and that can therefore be considered safe in the modular construction of these systems. As a case study, we apply these techniques to the Dining Cryptographers, and we derive a generalization of Chaum's strong anonymity result.

1. Introduction

During the last decade, internet activities have become an important part of many people's lives. As the number of these activities increases, there is a growing amount of personal information about the users that is stored in electronic form and that is usually transferred using public electronic means. This makes it feasible and often easy to collect, transfer and process a huge amount of information about a person. As a consequence, the need for mechanisms to protect such information is compelling.

A recent example of such privacy concerns are the so-called "biometric" passports. These passports, used by many countries and required by all visa waiver travelers to the United States, include an RFID chip containing information about the passport's owner. These chips can be read wirelessly without any contact with the passport and without the owner even knowing that his passport is being read. It is clear that such devices need protection mechanisms to ensure that the contained information will not be revealed to any non-authorized person.

In general, privacy can be defined as the ability of users to prevent information about

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themselves from becoming known to people other than those they choose to give the information to. We can further categorize privacy properties based on the nature of the hidden information. *Data protection* usually refers to confidential data like the credit card number. *Anonymity*, on the other hand, concerns the identity of the user who performed a certain action. *Unlinkability* refers to the link between the information and the user, and *unobservability* regards the actions of a user.

Information-hiding protocols aim at ensuring a privacy property during an electronic transaction. For example, the voting protocol Foo 92 (Fujioka, Okamoto & Ohta 1993) allows a user to cast a vote without revealing the link between the voter and the vote. The anonymity protocol Crowds (Reiter & Rubin 1998) allows a user to send a message on a public network without revealing the identity of the sender. These kinds of protocols often use *randomization* to introduce *noise*, thus limiting the inference power of a malicious observer.

1.1. Information theory

At an abstract level information-hiding protocols can be viewed as *information-theoretic channels*. A channel consists of a set of input values \mathcal{S} , a set of output values \mathcal{O} (the observables) and a transition matrix which gives the conditional probability $p(o|s)$ of producing o as the output when s is the input. In the case of privacy preserving protocols, \mathcal{S} contains the secret information that we want to protect and \mathcal{O} the facts that the attacker can observe. This framework allows us to apply concepts from information theory to reason about the knowledge that the attacker can gain about the input by observing the output of the protocol (*information leakage*). This leakage is usually expressed in terms of *mutual information*, that is the difference between the a priori entropy (the initial uncertainty of the attacker) and the a posteriori entropy (the uncertainty of the attacker after the observation). The channel *capacity*, that is defined as the maximum mutual information under all possible a priori distributions, represents the worst case of leakage.

1.2. Hypothesis testing

Information theory is parametric on the notion of entropy. The most popular one is Shannon entropy, because of its relation with the channel's transmission rate. With respect to the problem of information-hiding, however, one of the most natural notion is arguably the Rényi min entropy (Rényi 1961). As discussed by Smith (Smith 2009), this notion represents well the *one-try attacks*, and it is strictly related to the problem of *hypothesis testing* and to the *Bayes risk*.

In information-hiding systems the attacker finds himself in the following scenario: he cannot directly detect the information of interest, namely the actual value of the random variable $S \in \mathcal{S}$, but he can discover the value of another random variable $O \in \mathcal{O}$ which depends on S according to a known conditional distribution. This kind of situation is quite common also in other disciplines, like medicine, biology, and experimental physics, to mention a few. The attempt to infer S from O is called *hypothesis testing* (the “hy-

pothesis” to be validated is the actual value of S), and it has been widely investigated in statistics.

One of the most used approaches to this problem is the Bayesian method, which consists in assuming as known the a priori probability of the distribution of the hypotheses, and in deriving from that (and from the matrix of the conditional probabilities) the a posteriori distribution after a certain fact has been observed. It is well known that the best strategy for the adversary is to apply the MAP (Maximum Aposteriori Probability) criterion, which, as the name says, dictates that one should choose the hypothesis with the maximum a posteriori probability for the given observation. “Best” means that this strategy induces the smallest probability of error in the guess of the hypothesis. The probability of error, in this case, is called *Bayes risk*. The a posteriori Rényi min entropy is the logarithm of the converse of the Bayes risk[†]. In (Chatzikokolakis, Palamidessi & Panangaden 2008b), we proposed to define the *degree of protection* provided by a protocol as the Bayes risk associated to the matrix. McIver et al. (McIver, Meinicke & Morgan 2010) have shown that the Bayes risk is the maximally discriminating among various notions of entropy, when compositionality is taken into account.

A major problem with the Bayesian method is that the a priori distribution is not always known. This is particularly true in security applications. In some cases, it may be possible to approximate the a priori distribution by statistical inference, but in most cases, especially when the input information changes over time, it may not. Thus other methods need to be considered, which do not depend on the a priori distribution. One such method is the one based on the so-called *Maximum Likelihood* criterion.

1.3. Contribution

In this paper we consider the Bayesian hypothesis-testing approach to the one-try attacks, under the assumption that the input distribution is known. We consider as degree of protection the Bayes risk, i.e. the probability of error of an adversary trying to discover the secret using the MAP rule.

Next, we consider a probabilistic process algebra for the specification of information-hiding protocols, and we investigate which constructs in the language can be used safely in the sense that by applying them to a term, the degree of protection provided by the term does not decrease. This provides a criterion to build specifications in a compositional way, while preserving the degree of protection.

We apply these compositional methods to the example of the Dining Cryptographers, and we are able to strengthen the strong anonymity result by Chaum. Namely we show that we can have strong anonymity even if some coins are unfair, provided that there is a spanning tree of fair ones. This result is obtained by adding processes representing coins to the specification and using the fact that this can be done with a safe construct.

[†] There are other possible definitions of the a posteriori Rényi min entropy. Smith proposed to use this one because of its suitability for the information-hiding problem.

1.4. Plan of the paper

In the next section we recall some basic notions. Section 3 introduces the language CCS_p . Section 4 shows how to model protocols and process terms as channels. Section 5 discusses hypothesis testing and presents some properties of the probability of error. Section 6 characterizes the constructs of CCS_p which are safe. Section 7 applies previous results to find a new property of the Dining Cryptographers. Section 8 discusses related work. Section 9 concludes.

2. Preliminaries

In this section we give a brief overview of the technical concepts from the literature that will be used through the paper. More precisely, we recall some basic notions of metric spaces (see for instance (Munkres 2000)), probability theory (see for instance (Chung 2000)) and probabilistic automata (Segala 1995, Segala & Lynch 1995).

2.1. Metric spaces

A *metric space* is a pair (X, d) where X is a set and $d : X \times X \rightarrow [0, \infty)$ is a function (called *distance* or *metric*) which satisfies the following properties:

- for all $x, y \in X$, $d(x, y) = 0$ if and only if $x = y$,
- for all $x, y \in X$, $d(x, y) = d(y, x)$,
- for all $x, y, z \in X$, $d(x, y) \leq d(y, z) + d(z, y)$.

Let (X, d) be a metric space. A sequence of elements in X is converging if it has a limit in X with respect to the distance d . The metric space (X, d) is called *compact* if every sequence of elements in X has a converging subsequence.

2.2. Probability spaces

Let Ω be a set. A σ -field over Ω is a collection \mathcal{F} of subsets of Ω closed under complement and countable union and such that $\Omega \in \mathcal{F}$. If \mathcal{B} is a collection of subsets of Ω then the σ -field generated by \mathcal{B} is defined as the smallest σ -field containing \mathcal{B} (its existence is ensured by the fact that the intersection of an arbitrary set of σ -fields containing \mathcal{B} is still a σ -field containing \mathcal{B}).

A *measure* on \mathcal{F} is a function $\mu : \mathcal{F} \rightarrow [0, \infty]$ such that

- 1 $\mu(\emptyset) = 0$ and
- 2 $\mu(\bigcup_i C_i) = \sum_i \mu(C_i)$ if $\{C_i\}_i$ is a countable collection of pairwise disjoint elements of \mathcal{F} .

A *probability measure* on \mathcal{F} is a measure μ on \mathcal{F} such that $\mu(\Omega) = 1$. A *probability space* is a tuple $(\Omega, \mathcal{F}, \mu)$ where Ω is a set, called the *sample space*, \mathcal{F} is a σ -field on Ω and μ is a probability measure on \mathcal{F} . The elements of a σ -field \mathcal{F} are also called *events*.

We will denote by $\delta(x)$ (called the *Dirac measure* on x) the probability measure s.t. $\delta(x)(\{y\}) = 1$ if $y = x$, and $\delta(x)(\{y\}) = 0$ otherwise. If $\{c_i\}_i$ are convex coefficients,

and $\{\mu_i\}_i$ are probability measures, we will denote by $\sum_i c_i \mu_i$ the probability measure defined as $(\sum_i c_i \mu_i)(A) = \sum_i c_i \mu_i(A)$.

If A, B are events then $A \cap B$ is also an event. If $\mu(A) > 0$ then we can define the *conditional probability* $p(B|A)$, meaning “the probability of B given that A holds”, as

$$p(B|A) = \frac{\mu(A \cap B)}{\mu(A)}$$

Note that $p(\cdot|A)$ is a new probability measure on \mathcal{F} . In continuous probability spaces, where many events have zero probability, it is possible to generalize the concept of conditional probability to allow conditioning on such events. However, this is not necessary for the needs of this paper. Thus we will use the above “traditional” definition of conditional probability and make sure that we never condition on events of zero probability.

A probability space and the corresponding probability measure are called *discrete* if Ω is countable and $\mathcal{F} = 2^\Omega$. In this case, we can construct μ from a function $p : \Omega \rightarrow [0, 1]$ satisfying $\sum_{x \in \Omega} p(x) = 1$ by assigning $\mu(\{x\}) = p(x)$. The set of all discrete probability measures with sample space Ω will be denoted by $Disc(\Omega)$.

2.3. Probabilistic automata

A *probabilistic automaton* \mathcal{M} is a tuple $(St, T_{init}, Act, \mathcal{T})$ where St is a set of states, $T_{init} \in St$ is the *initial state*, Act is a set of actions and $\mathcal{T} \subseteq St \times Act \times Disc(St)$ is a *transition relation*. Intuitively, if $(T, a, \mu) \in \mathcal{T}$ then there is a transition from the state T performing the action a and leading to a distribution μ over the states of the automaton. (We use T for states instead of s because later in the paper states will be (process) terms, and s will be used for sequences of actions.) We also write $T \xrightarrow{a} \mu$ if $(T, a, \mu) \in \mathcal{T}$. The idea is that the choice of transition among the available ones in \mathcal{T} is performed nondeterministically, and the choice of the target state among the ones allowed by μ (i.e., those states T' such that $\mu(T') > 0$) is performed probabilistically. A probabilistic automaton \mathcal{M} is *fully probabilistic* if from each state of \mathcal{M} there is at most one transition available.

An *execution fragment* α of a probabilistic automaton is a (possibly infinite) sequence $T_0 a_1 T_1 a_2 T_2 \dots$ of alternating states and actions, such that for each i there is a transition $(T_i, a_{i+1}, \mu_i) \in \mathcal{T}$ and $\mu_i(T_{i+1}) > 0$. We will use $fst(\alpha)$, $lst(\alpha)$ to denote the first and last state of a finite execution fragment α respectively. An *execution* (or *history*) is an execution fragment such that $fst(\alpha) = T_{init}$. An execution α is maximal if it is infinite or there is no transition from $lst(\alpha)$ in \mathcal{T} . We denote by $exec^*(\mathcal{M})$, $exec^\perp(\mathcal{M})$, and $exec(\mathcal{M})$ the set of all the finite, all the non-maximal, and all executions of \mathcal{M} , respectively.

A *scheduler* of a probabilistic automaton $\mathcal{M} = (St, T_{init}, Act, \mathcal{T})$ is a function

$$\zeta : exec^\perp(\mathcal{M}) \rightarrow \mathcal{T}$$

such that $\zeta(\alpha) = (T, a, \mu) \in \mathcal{T}$ implies that $T = lst(\alpha)$.

The idea is that a scheduler selects a transition among the ones available in \mathcal{T} and it can base his decision on the history of the execution. The *execution tree* of \mathcal{M} relative to the scheduler ζ , denoted by $etree(\mathcal{M}, \zeta)$, is a fully probabilistic automaton $\mathcal{M}' =$

$(St', T_{init}, Act, \mathcal{T}')$ such that $St' \subseteq exec^*(\mathcal{M})$, and $(\alpha, a, \mu') \in \mathcal{T}'$ if and only if $\zeta(\alpha) = (lst(\alpha), a, \mu)$ for some μ , and $\mu'(\alpha a T) = \mu(T)$. Intuitively, $etree(M, \zeta)$ is produced by unfolding the executions of \mathcal{M} and resolving the nondeterminism using ζ .

In the following, given two executions α, α' , we write $\alpha \leq \alpha'$ to indicate that α is a prefix of α' . Given a fully probabilistic automaton $\mathcal{M} = (St, T_{init}, Act, \mathcal{T})$ we can define a probability space $(\Omega_{\mathcal{M}}, \mathcal{F}_{\mathcal{M}}, p_{\mathcal{M}})$ on the space of executions of \mathcal{M} as follows:

- $\Omega_{\mathcal{M}} \subseteq exec(\mathcal{M})$ is the set of maximal executions of \mathcal{M} .
- If α is a finite execution of \mathcal{M} we define the cone with prefix α as $C_{\alpha} = \{\alpha' \in \Omega_{\mathcal{M}} | \alpha \leq \alpha'\}$. Let $\mathcal{C}_{\mathcal{M}}$ be the collection of all cones of \mathcal{M} . Then \mathcal{F} is the σ -field generated by $\mathcal{C}_{\mathcal{M}}$ (by closing under complement and countable union).
- We define the probability of a cone C_{α} where $\alpha = T_0 a_1 T_1 \dots a_n T_n$ as

$$p(C_{\alpha}) = \prod_{i=1}^n \mu_i(T_i)$$

where μ_i is the (unique because the automaton is fully probabilistic) measure such that $(T_{i-1}, a_i, \mu_i) \in \mathcal{T}$. We define $p_{\mathcal{M}}$ as the measure extending p to \mathcal{F} (see (Segala 1995) for more details about this construction).

3. CCS with internal probabilistic choice

We consider an extension of standard CCS ((Milner 1989)) obtained by adding internal probabilistic choice. The resulting calculus CCS_p can be seen as a simplified version of the probabilistic π -calculus presented in (Herescu & Palamidessi 2000, Palamidessi & Herescu 2005) and it is similar to the one considered in (Deng, Palamidessi & Pang 2005). Like in those calculi, computations have both a probabilistic and a nondeterministic nature. The main conceptual novelty is a distinction between *observable* and *secret* actions, introduced for the purpose of specifying information-hiding protocols.

We assume a countable set *Act* of actions a , and we assume that it is partitioned into a set *Sec* of *secret actions* s , a set *Obs* of *observable actions* o , and the silent action τ . For each $s \in Sec$ we assume a complementary action $\bar{s} \in Sec$ such that $\bar{\bar{s}} = s$, and the same for *Obs*. The silent action τ does not have a complementary action, so the notation \bar{a} will imply that $a \in Sec$ or $a \in Obs$.

The syntax of CCS_p is the following:

PROB	$\frac{}{\sum_i p_i T_i \xrightarrow{\tau} \sum_i p_i \delta(T_i)}$	ACT	$\frac{j \in I}{\sqcup_I a_i.T_i \xrightarrow{a_j} \delta(T_j)}$
PAR1	$\frac{T_1 \xrightarrow{a} \mu}{T_1 \parallel T_2 \xrightarrow{a} \mu \parallel T_2}$	PAR2	$\frac{T_2 \xrightarrow{a} \mu}{T_1 \parallel T_2 \xrightarrow{a} T_1 \parallel \mu}$
		REP	$\frac{T \parallel !T \xrightarrow{a} \mu}{!T \xrightarrow{a} \mu \parallel !T}$
COM	$\frac{T_1 \xrightarrow{a} \delta(T'_1) \quad T_2 \xrightarrow{\bar{a}} \delta(T'_2)}{T_1 \parallel T_2 \xrightarrow{\tau} \delta(T'_1 \parallel T'_2)}$	RES	$\frac{T \xrightarrow{b} \mu \quad \alpha \neq a, \bar{a}}{(\nu a)T \xrightarrow{b} (\nu a)\mu}$

Table 1. *The semantics of CCS_p.*

$T ::=$	<i>process term</i>
$\sum_i p_i T_i$	<i>probabilistic choice</i>
$ \quad \sqcup_i s_i.T_i$	<i>secret choice</i> ($s_i \in \text{Sec}$)
$ \quad \sqcup_i r_i.T_i$	<i>nondeterministic choice</i> ($r_i \in \text{Obs} \cup \{\tau\}$)
$ \quad T \parallel T$	<i>parallel composition</i>
$ \quad (\nu a)T$	<i>restriction</i>
$ \quad !T$	<i>replication</i>

All the summations in the syntax are finite. We will use the notation $T_1 \oplus_p T_2$ to represent a binary probabilistic choice $\sum_i p_i T_i$ with $p_1 = p$ and $p_2 = 1 - p$. Similarly we will use $a_1.T_1 \sqcup a_2.T_2$ to represent a binary secret or nondeterministic choice. For the parallel operator we use the symbol “ \parallel ” instead than the more standard “ $|$ ” to avoid confusion with the notation for conditional probability.

The semantics of a given CCS_p term is a probabilistic automaton whose states are process terms, whose initial state is the given term, and whose transitions \mathcal{T} are those derivable from the rules in Table 1. We recall that we use the notation $T \xrightarrow{a} \mu$ stands for $(T, a, \mu) \in \mathcal{T}$. We denote by $\mu \parallel T$ the measure μ' such that $\mu'(T' \parallel T) = \mu(T')$ for all processes T' and $\mu'(T'') = 0$ if T'' is not of the form $T' \parallel T$, and similarly for $T \parallel \mu$. Furthermore we denote by $(\nu a)\mu$ the measure μ' such that $\mu'((\nu a)T) = \mu(T)$, and $\mu'(T') = 0$ if T' is not of the form $(\nu a)T$.

Note that in the produced probabilistic automaton, all transitions to non-Dirac measures are silent. Note also that a probabilistic term generates exactly one (probabilistic) transition.

A transition of the form $T \xrightarrow{a} \delta(T')$, i.e., a transition having for target a Dirac measure, corresponds to a transition of a non-probabilistic automaton (a standard labeled transition system). Thus, all the rules of CCS_p specialize to the ones of CCS except from PROB. The latter models the internal probabilistic choice: a silent τ transition is available from the sum to a measure containing all of its operands, with the corresponding probabilities.

A secret choice $\lfloor \vdash \rfloor_i s_i.T_i$ produces the same transitions as the nondeterministic term $\lfloor \vdash \rfloor_i r_i.T_i$, except for the labels.

The distinction between the two kind of labels influences the notion of scheduler for CCS_p : the secret actions are assumed to be *inputs* of the system. Namely we assume that the process receives in input a sequence of secret actions, and a secret action in the process can only be performed if it matches the next secret action in the input (this match “consumes” the input). Hence some choices are determined, or influenced, by the input. In particular, a secret choice with different guards is entirely decided by the input. The scheduler has to resolve only the residual nondeterminism which derives from the nondeterministic choices and from the interleavings.

In the following, we use the notation $X \rightarrow Y$ to represent the partial functions from X to Y , and $\alpha|_{\text{Sec}}$ represents the projection of α on Sec .

Definition 3.1. Let T be a process in CCS_p and \mathcal{M} be the probabilistic automaton generated by T . A scheduler is a function

$$\zeta : \text{Sec}^* \rightarrow \text{exec}^*(\mathcal{M}) \rightarrow \mathcal{T}$$

such that:

- if (i) $s = s_1 s_2 \dots s_n$ and $\alpha|_{\text{Sec}} = s_1 s_2 \dots s_m$ with $m \leq n$,
- and (ii) there exists a transition $(\text{lst}(\alpha), a, \mu)$ such that either $a \notin \text{Sec}$, or $(a \in \text{Sec} \text{ and } a = s_{m+1})$,
- then $\zeta(s)(\alpha)$ is defined, and it is one of the transitions that satisfy (ii).

We will write $\zeta_s(\alpha)$ for $\zeta(s)(\alpha)$.

Note that this definition of scheduler is different from the one used in probabilistic automaton, where the scheduler can decide to stop, even if a transition is allowed. Here the scheduler must proceed whenever a transition is allowed (provided that if it is labeled by a secret, that secret is the next one in the input string s). This view is in line with the standard operational semantics of CCS, where all enabled transitions are possible.

We now adapt the definition of *execution tree* from the notion found in probabilistic automata. In our case, the execution tree depends not only on the scheduler, but also on the input.

Definition 3.2. Let $\mathcal{M} = (St, T, \text{Act}, \mathcal{T})$ be the probabilistic automaton generated by a CCS_p process T , where St is the set of processes reachable from T . Given an input s and a scheduler ζ , the *execution tree* of T for s and ζ , denoted by $\text{etree}(T, s, \zeta)$, is a fully probabilistic automaton $\mathcal{M}' = (St', T, \text{Act}, \mathcal{T}')$ such that $St' \subseteq \text{exec}(\mathcal{M})$, and $(\alpha, a, \mu') \in \mathcal{T}'$ if and only if $\zeta_s(\alpha) = (\text{lst}(\alpha), a, \mu)$ for some μ , and $\mu'(\alpha a T) = \mu(T)$.

Note that we do not require the input s to be completely consumed during the execution. Typically, the execution consumes only the prefix of s which is to proceed at each step in which a secret action is involved.

4. Modeling protocols for information-hiding

In this section we propose an abstract model for information-hiding protocols, and we show how to represent this model in CCS_p . An extended example is presented in Section 7.

4.1. Protocols as channels

We view protocols as *channels* in the information-theoretic sense (Cover & Thomas 1991). The secret information that the protocol is trying to conceal constitutes the input of the channel, and the observables constitute the outputs. The set of the possible inputs and that of the possible outputs will be denoted by \mathcal{S} and \mathcal{O} respectively. We assume that \mathcal{S} and \mathcal{O} are of finite cardinality m and n respectively. We also assume a discrete probability distribution over the inputs, which we will denote by $\vec{\pi} = (\pi_1, \pi_2, \dots, \pi_m)$, where π_i is the probability of the i -th element of \mathcal{S} .

During the run, the protocol may use randomized operations to increase the level of uncertainty about the secrets and obfuscate the link with the observables. It may also have internal interactions between internal components, or other forms of nondeterministic behavior, but let us rule out this possibility for the moment, and consider a purely probabilistic protocol. We also assume there is exactly one output from each run of the protocol, and again, this is not a restrictive assumption because the elements of \mathcal{O} can be structured data.

Given an input s , a run of the protocol will produce each $o \in \mathcal{O}$ with a certain probability $p(o|s)$ which depends on s and on the randomized operations performed by the protocol. Note that $p(o|s)$ depends only on the probability distributions on the mechanisms of the protocol, and not on the input distribution. The probabilities $p(o|s)$, for $s \in \mathcal{S}$ and $o \in \mathcal{O}$, constitute a $m \times n$ array M which is called the *matrix* of the channel, where the rows are indexed by the elements of \mathcal{S} and the columns are indexed by the elements of \mathcal{O} . We will use the notation $(\mathcal{S}, \mathcal{O}, M)$ to represent the channel.

Note that the input distribution $\vec{\pi}$ and the probabilities $p(o|s)$ determine a distribution on the output. We will represent by $p(o)$ the probability of $o \in \mathcal{O}$. Thus both the input and the output can be considered *random variables*. We will denote these random variables by S and O .

If the protocol contains some form of nondeterminism, like internal components giving rise to different interleaving and interactions, then the behavior of the protocol, and in particular the output, will depend on the scheduling policy. We can reduce this case to previous (purely probabilistic) scenario by assuming a scheduler ζ which resolves the nondeterminism entirely. Of course, the conditional probabilities, and therefore the matrix, will depend on ζ , too. We will express this dependency by using the notation M_ζ .

4.2. Process terms as channels

A given CCS_p term T can be regarded as a protocol in which the input is constituted by sequences of secret actions, and the output by sequences of observable actions. We consider sequences as inputs instead than single actions, in order to be more general,

and to account for the interactive nature of a process. Furthermore when the operational semantics of a process calculus is expressed in terms of a labeled transition system (and this is necessary in our context in order to achieve the compositionally results), it is customary to use sequences of labels to represent the input/output behavior. On the other hand, the standard notion of information-theoretic channel has only one input and one output, hence we need to regard the whole sequence of secret actions as one secret (the input of the channel), and analogously for the output.

We assume that only a finite set of finite sequences is relevant. This is certainly true if the term is terminating, which is usually the case in security protocols, as each session is supposed to terminate in finite time. For the sake of generality, we allow the element of \mathcal{S} (resp. \mathcal{O}) to have different lengths. Thus $\mathcal{S} \subseteq_{fin} Sec^*$ and $\mathcal{O} \subseteq_{fin} Obs^*$.

Definition 4.1. Given a term T and a scheduler $\zeta : \mathcal{S} \rightarrow exec^*(\mathcal{M}) \rightarrow \mathcal{T}$, the matrix $M_\zeta(T)$ associated with T under ζ is defined as the matrix such that, for each $s \in \mathcal{S}$ and $o \in \mathcal{O}$, $p(o|s)$ is the probability of the set of the maximal executions in $etree(T, s, \zeta)$ whose projection on Obs is o .

The following remark may be useful to understand the nature of the above definition:

Remark 4.2. Given a sequence $s = s_1 s_2 \dots s_h$, consider the term

$$T' = (\nu Sec)(\bar{s}_1.\bar{s}_2.\dots.\bar{s}_h.0 \parallel T)$$

Given a scheduler ζ for T , let ζ' be the scheduler on T' that chooses the transition

$$((\nu Sec)(\bar{s}_j.\bar{s}_{j+1}.\dots.\bar{s}_h.0 \parallel U), r, (\nu Sec)(\bar{s}_j.\bar{s}_{j+1}.\dots.\bar{s}_h.0 \parallel \mu))$$

if ζ_s chooses (U, r, μ) , with $(r \notin Sec)$, and it chooses

$$((\nu Sec)(\bar{s}_j.\bar{s}_{j+1}.\dots.\bar{s}_h.0 \parallel U), \tau, (\nu Sec)(\delta(\bar{s}_{j+1}.\dots.\bar{s}_h.0 \parallel (U'))))$$

if ζ_s chooses $(U, s_j, \delta(U'))$.

Note that ζ' is a “standard” scheduler, i.e., it does not depend on an input sequence.

We have that each element $p(o|s)$ in $M_\zeta(T)$ is equal to the probability of the set of all the maximal executions of T' , under ζ' , whose projection on Obs gives o .

5. Inferring the secrets from the observables

In this section we discuss possible methods by which an adversary can try to infer the secrets from the observables, and consider the corresponding probability of error, that is, the probability that the adversary draws the wrong conclusion. We regard the probability of error as a representative of the degree of protection provided by the protocol, and we study its properties with respect to the associated matrix.

We start by defining the notion of *decision function*, which represents the guess the adversary makes about the secrets, for each observable. This is a well-known concept, particularly in the field of *hypothesis testing*, where the purpose is to try to discover the valid hypothesis from the observed facts, knowing the probabilistic relation between the possible hypotheses and their consequences. In our scenario, the hypotheses are the secrets.

Definition 5.1. A decision function for a channel $(\mathcal{S}, \mathcal{O}, M)$ is any function $f : \mathcal{O} \rightarrow \mathcal{S}$.

Given a channel $(\mathcal{S}, \mathcal{O}, M)$, an input distribution $\vec{\pi}$, and a decision function f , the *probability of error* $\mathcal{P}(f, M, \vec{\pi})$ is the average probability of guessing the wrong hypothesis by using f , weighted on the probability of the observable (see for instance (Cover & Thomas 1991)). The probability that, given o , s is the wrong hypothesis is $1 - p(s|o)$ (with a slight abuse of notation, we use $p(\cdot|\cdot)$ to represent also the probability of the input given the output). Hence we have:

Definition 5.2. (Cover & Thomas 1991) The probability of error with respect to a decision function f is defined by

$$\mathcal{P}(f, M, \vec{\pi}) = 1 - \sum_{\mathcal{O}} p(o)p(f(o)|o)$$

Given a channel $(\mathcal{S}, \mathcal{O}, M)$, the best decision function that the adversary can use, namely the one that minimizes the probability of error, is the one associated with the so-called MAP rule, which prescribes choosing the hypothesis s which has *Maximum A posteriori Probability* (for a given $o \in \mathcal{O}$), namely the s for which $p(s|o)$ is maximum. The fact that the MAP rule represent the ‘best bet’ of the adversary is rather intuitive, and well known in the literature. We refer to (Cover & Thomas 1991) for a formal proof.

The MAP rule is used in the so-called *Bayesian approach* to hypothesis testing, and the corresponding probability of error is also known as *Bayes risk*. We will denote it by $\mathcal{P}_{MAP}(M, \vec{\pi})$. The following characterization is an immediate consequence of Definition 5.2 and of the Bayes theorem $p(s|o) = p(o|s)\pi_s/p(o)$.

$$\mathcal{P}_{MAP}(M, \vec{\pi}) = 1 - \sum_{\mathcal{O}} \max_s (p(o|s)\pi_s)$$

It is natural then to define the degree of protection associated with a process term as the infimum probability of error that we can obtain from this term under every compatible scheduler (in a given class).

In the following, we assume the class of schedulers \mathcal{A} to be the set of all the schedulers compatible with the given input \mathcal{S} .

It turns out that the infimum probability of error on \mathcal{A} is achievable, i.e., it is actually a minimum. In order to prove this fact, let us first define a suitable metric on \mathcal{A} .

Definition 5.3. Consider a CCS_p process T , and let \mathcal{M} be the probabilistic automaton generated by T . We define a distance d between schedulers in \mathcal{A} as follows:

$$d(\zeta, \zeta') = \begin{cases} 2^{-m} & \text{if } m = \min\{|\alpha| \mid \alpha \in \text{exec}^*(\mathcal{M}) \text{ and } \zeta(\alpha) \neq \zeta'(\alpha)\} \\ 0 & \text{if } \zeta(\alpha) = \zeta'(\alpha) \text{ for all } \alpha \in \text{exec}^*(\mathcal{M}) \end{cases}$$

where $|\alpha|$ represents the length of α .

Note that \mathcal{M} is finitely branching, both in the nondeterministic and in the probabilistic choices, in the sense that from every node T' there is only a finite number of transitions

(T', a, μ) and μ is a finite summation of the form $\mu = \sum_i p_i \delta(T_i)$. Hence we have the following (standard) result:

Proposition 5.4. (\mathcal{A}, d) is a *compact* metric space, i.e., every sequence has a convergent subsequence (namely a subsequence with a limit in \mathcal{A}).

We are now ready to show that there exists a scheduler that gives the minimum probability of error:

Proposition 5.5. For every CCS_p process T we have that there exists a minimizing $\zeta_m \in \mathcal{A}$ such that

$$\inf_{\zeta \in \mathcal{A}} \mathcal{P}_{\text{MAP}}(M_\zeta(T), \vec{\pi}) = \mathcal{P}_{\text{MAP}}(M_{\zeta_m}(T), \vec{\pi}) = \min_{\zeta \in \mathcal{A}} \mathcal{P}_{\text{MAP}}(M_\zeta(T), \vec{\pi})$$

Proof. By Proposition 5.4, (\mathcal{A}, d) is compact. Furthermore, $\mathcal{P}_{\text{MAP}}(M_\zeta(T), \vec{\pi})$ is a continuous function from (\mathcal{A}, d) to $([0, 1], d')$, where d' is the standard distance on real numbers. In fact, since \mathcal{S} and \mathcal{O} are finite sets of finite sequences, we have that for every T there exists a δ such that $d(\zeta, \zeta') < \delta$ implies $M_\zeta(T) = M_{\zeta'}(T)$. Consequently, $(\{\mathcal{P}_{\text{MAP}}(M_\zeta(T), \vec{\pi}) \mid \zeta \in \mathcal{A}\}, d')$ is also compact, and, since it represents a set of probabilities, it is bounded, too. The rest follows from the fact that compact and bounded subsets of reals are closed, and hence they contain their infima. \square

Thanks to previous proposition, we can define the degree of protection provided by a protocols in terms of the minimum probability of error.

Definition 5.6. Given a CCS_p process T , the protection $Pt_{\text{MAP}}(T)$ provided by T , in the Bayesian approach, is given by

$$Pt_{\text{MAP}}(T, \vec{\pi}) = \min_{\zeta \in \mathcal{A}} \mathcal{P}_{\text{MAP}}(M_\zeta(T), \vec{\pi})$$

We conclude this section with some properties of \mathcal{P}_{MAP} . The next proposition shows that the probabilities of error are *concave* functions with respect to the space of matrices.

Proposition 5.7. Consider a family of channels $\{(\mathcal{S}, \mathcal{O}, M_i)\}_{i \in I}$, and a family $\{c_i\}_{i \in I}$ of convex coefficients, namely $0 \leq c_i \leq 1$ for all $i \in I$, and $\sum_{i \in I} c_i = 1$. Then:

$$\mathcal{P}_{\text{MAP}}\left(\sum_{i \in I} c_i M_i, \vec{\pi}\right) \geq \sum_{i \in I} c_i \mathcal{P}_{\text{MAP}}(M_i, \vec{\pi})$$

Proof. Consider $\forall i \in I, M_i = (p_i(o|s))_{s \in \mathcal{S}, o \in \mathcal{O}}$. Then:

$$\begin{aligned}
\mathcal{P}_{MAP}(\sum_i c_i M_i, \vec{\pi}) &= 1 - \sum_o \max_s (\sum_i c_i p_i(o|s) \pi_s) \\
&\geq 1 - \sum_o \sum_i c_i \max_s (p_i(o|s) \pi_s) \\
&= 1 - \sum_i \sum_o c_i \max_s (p_i(o|s) \pi_s) \quad (\text{since the summands are positive}) \\
&= 1 - \sum_i c_i \sum_o \max_s (p_i(o|s) \pi_s) \\
&= \sum_{i \in I} c_i - \sum_{i \in I} c_i \sum_{o \in \mathcal{O}} \max_s (p_i(o|s) \pi_s) \quad (\text{since } \sum_{i \in I} c_i = 1) \\
&= \sum_{i \in I} c_i (1 - \sum_{o \in \mathcal{O}} \max_s (p_i(o|s) \pi_s)) \\
&= \sum_{i \in I} c_i \mathcal{P}_{MAP}(M_i, \vec{\pi})
\end{aligned}$$

□

Corollary 5.8. Consider a family of channels $\{(\mathcal{S}, \mathcal{O}, M_i)\}_{i \in I}$, and a family $\{c_i\}_{i \in I}$ of convex coefficients. Then:

$$\mathcal{P}_{MAP}(\sum_{i \in I} c_i M_i, \vec{\pi}) \geq \min_{i \in I} \mathcal{P}_{MAP}(M_i, \vec{\pi})$$

The next proposition shows that if we transform the observables, and collapse the columns corresponding to observables which have become the same after the transformation, the probability of error does not decrease.

Proposition 5.9. Consider a channel $(\mathcal{S}, \mathcal{O}, M)$, where M has conditional probabilities $p(o|s)$, and a transformation of the observables $f : \mathcal{O} \rightarrow \mathcal{O}'$. Let M' be the matrix whose conditional probabilities are $p'(o'|s) = \sum_{f(o)=o'} p(o|s)$ and consider the new channel $(\mathcal{S}, \mathcal{O}', M')$. Then:

$$\mathcal{P}_{MAP}(M', \vec{\pi}) \geq \mathcal{P}_{MAP}(M, \vec{\pi})$$

Proof. The result derives from:

$$\begin{aligned}
\sum_{o' \in \mathcal{O}'} \max_s (p'(o'|s) \pi_s) &= \sum_{o' \in \mathcal{O}'} \max_s (\sum_{f(o)=o'} p(o|s) \pi_s) \\
&\leq \sum_{o' \in \mathcal{O}'} \sum_{f(o)=o'} \max_s (p(o|s) \pi_s) \\
&= \sum_{o \in \mathcal{O}} \max_s (p(o|s) \pi_s)
\end{aligned}$$

□

The following propositions are from the literature.

Proposition 5.10. (Chatzikokolakis, Palamidessi & Panangaden 2008a) Given \mathcal{S}, \mathcal{O} , let M be a matrix indexed on \mathcal{S}, \mathcal{O} such that all the rows of M are equal, namely $p(o|s) = p(o|s')$ for all $o \in \mathcal{O}, s, s' \in \mathcal{S}$. Then,

$$\mathcal{P}_{MAP}(M, \vec{\pi}) = 1 - \max_s \pi_s$$

Furthermore $\mathcal{P}_{MAP}(M, \vec{\pi})$ is the maximum probability of error, i.e., for every other matrix

M' indexed on \mathcal{S}, \mathcal{O} we have:

$$\mathcal{P}_{MAP}(M, \vec{\pi}) \geq \mathcal{P}_{MAP}(M', \vec{\pi})$$

Proposition 5.11. (Bhargava & Palamidessi 2005) Given a channel $(\mathcal{S}, \mathcal{O}, M)$, the rows of M are equal (and hence the probability of error is maximum) if and only if $p(s|o) = \pi_s$ for all $s \in \mathcal{S}, o \in \mathcal{O}$.

The condition $p(s|o) = \pi_s$ means that the observation does not give any additional information concerning the hypothesis. In other words, the *a posteriori* probability of s coincides with its *a priori* probability. The property $p(s|o) = \pi_s$ for all $s \in \mathcal{S}$ and $o \in \mathcal{O}$ was used as a definition of (strong) anonymity by Chaum (Chaum 1988) and was called *conditional anonymity* by Halpern and O'Neill (Halpern & O'Neill 2005).

6. Safe constructs

In this section we investigate constructs of the language CCS_p which are *safe* with respect to the protection of the secrets.

We start by giving some conditions that will allow us to ensure the safety of the parallel and the restriction operators.

Definition 6.1. Consider process term T , and the observables o_1, o_2, \dots, o_k such that

- (i) T does not contain any secret action, and
- (ii) the observable actions of T are included in o_1, o_2, \dots, o_k .

Then we say that T is safe outside o_1, o_2, \dots, o_k .

The following theorem states our main results for Pt_{MAP} . Note that they are also valid for Pt_{ML} , because $Pt_{ML}(T) = Pt_{MAP}(T, \vec{\pi}_u)$. In the following, given a function $f : X \rightarrow \mathbb{R}$ for which an element x_m exists such that $f(x_m) = \min_{x \in X} f(x)$, we will denote such x_m by $\text{minarg}_{x \in X} f(x)$ or alternatively by $\text{minarg}_X f(x)$.

Theorem 6.2. The probabilistic choice, the nondeterministic choice, and a restricted form of parallel composition are safe constructs, namely, for every input probability π , and any terms T_1, T_2, \dots, T_h , we have

$$(1) \quad Pt_{MAP}(\sum_i p_i T_i, \vec{\pi}) \geq \sum_i p_i Pt_{MAP}(T_i, \vec{\pi}) \geq \min_i Pt_{MAP}(T_i, \vec{\pi})$$

$$(2) \quad Pt_{MAP}(\left[+ \right]_i o_i.T_i, \vec{\pi}) = \min_i Pt_{MAP}(T_i, \vec{\pi})$$

$$(3) \quad Pt_{MAP}((\nu o_1, o_2, \dots, o_k) (T_1 \parallel T_2)) \geq Pt_{MAP}(T_2, \vec{\pi})$$

if T_1 is safe outside o_1, o_2, \dots, o_k .

Proof.

- 1 By definition $Pt_{MAP}(\sum_i p_i T_i, \vec{\pi}) = \min_{\zeta \in \mathcal{A}} \mathcal{P}_{MAP}(M_\zeta(\sum_i p_i T_i), \vec{\pi})$.
Let $\zeta_m = \text{minarg}_{\mathcal{A}} \mathcal{P}_{MAP}(M_\zeta(\sum_i p_i T_i), \vec{\pi})$. Hence

$$Pt_{MAP}(\sum_i p_i T_i, \vec{\pi}) = \mathcal{P}_{MAP}(M_{\zeta_m}(\sum_i p_i T_i), \vec{\pi})$$

Consider, for each i , the scheduler ζ_{mi} defined as ζ_m on the i -th branch, except for the removal of the first state and the first τ -step from the execution fragments in the domain. It's easy to see that

$$M_{\zeta_m}(\sum_i p_i T_i) = \sum_i p_i M_{\zeta_{mi}}(T_i)$$

From Proposition 5.7 we derive

$$\mathcal{P}_{MAP}(M_{\zeta_m}(\sum_i p_i T_i), \vec{\pi}) \geq \sum_i p_i \mathcal{P}_{MAP}(M_{\zeta_{mi}}(T_i), \vec{\pi})$$

Finally, observe that ζ_{mi} is still compatible with \mathcal{S} , hence we have

$$\mathcal{P}_{MAP}(M_{\zeta_{mi}}(T_i), \vec{\pi}) \geq Pt_{MAP}(T_i, \vec{\pi}) \quad \text{for all } i$$

which concludes the proof in this case.

- 2 Let $\zeta_m = \text{minarg}_{\mathcal{A}} \mathcal{P}_{MAP}(M_{\zeta}(\lfloor + \rfloor_i o_i.T_i), \vec{\pi})$. Let \mathcal{A}_i be the class of schedulers that choose the i -th branch at the beginning of the execution, and define

$$\zeta_{ni} = \text{minarg}_{\mathcal{A}_i} \mathcal{P}_{MAP}(M_{\zeta}(\lfloor + \rfloor_i o_i.T_i), \vec{\pi})$$

Obviously we have

$$Pt_{MAP}(\lfloor + \rfloor_i o_i.T_i, \vec{\pi}) = \min_i \mathcal{P}_{MAP}(M_{\zeta_{ni}}(\lfloor + \rfloor_i o_i.T_i), \vec{\pi})$$

Consider now, for each i , the scheduler ζ_{mi} defined as ζ_{ni} , except for the removal of the first state and the first step from the execution fragments in the domain. Obviously ζ_{mi} is still compatible with \mathcal{S} , and the observables of T_i are in one-to-one correspondence with those of $\lfloor + \rfloor_i o_i.T_i$ via the bijective function $f_i(o_i o_{j_1} \dots o_{j_k}) = o_{j_1} \dots o_{j_k}$. Furthermore, all the probabilities of the channel $M_{\zeta_{ni}}(\lfloor + \rfloor_i o_i.T_i)$ are the same as those of $M_{\zeta_{mi}}(T_i)$ modulo the renaming of o into $f(o)$. Hence we have

$$\mathcal{P}_{MAP}(M_{\zeta_{ni}}(\lfloor + \rfloor_i o_i.T_i), \vec{\pi}) = \mathcal{P}_{MAP}(M_{\zeta_{mi}}(T_i), \vec{\pi}) = Pt_{MAP}(T_i, \vec{\pi})$$

which concludes the proof of this case.

- 3 Let $\zeta_m = \text{minarg}_{\mathcal{A}} \mathcal{P}_{MAP}(M_{\zeta}((\nu o_1, o_2, \dots, o_k)(T_1 \parallel T_2)), \vec{\pi})$. Hence

$$Pt_{MAP}((\nu o_1, o_2, \dots, o_k)(T_1 \parallel T_2), \vec{\pi}) = \mathcal{P}_{MAP}(M_{\zeta_m}((\nu o_1, o_2, \dots, o_k)(T_1 \parallel T_2)), \vec{\pi})$$

The proof proceeds by constructing a set of series of schedulers whose limit with respect to the metric d in Definition 5.3 correspond to schedulers on the execution tree of T_2 . Consider a generic node in the execution tree of $(\nu o_1, o_2, \dots, o_k)(T_1 \parallel T_2)$ under ζ_m , and let $(\nu o_1, o_2, \dots, o_k)(T'_1 \parallel T'_2)$ be the new term in that node. Assume α to be the execution history up to that node. Let us consider separately the three possible kinds of transitions derivable from the operational semantics:

- (a) $(\nu o_1, o_2, \dots, o_k)(T'_1 \parallel T'_2) \xrightarrow{a} (\nu o_1, o_2, \dots, o_k)(\mu \parallel T'_2)$ due to a transition $T'_1 \xrightarrow{a} \mu$. In this case a must be τ because of the assumption that T_1 does not contain secret actions and all its observable actions are included in $\{o_1, o_2, \dots, o_k\}$. Assume

that $\mu = \sum_i p_i \delta(T'_{1i})$. Then we have

$$(\nu o_1, o_2, \dots, o_k) (\mu \parallel T'_2) = \sum_i p_i \delta((\nu o_1, o_2, \dots, o_k) (T'_{1i} \parallel T'_2)).$$

Let us now consider the tree obtained by replacing the above distribution by $\delta((\nu o_1, o_2, \dots, o_k) (T'_{1i} \parallel T'_2))$ (i.e., the tree obtained by pruning all alternatives except $(\nu o_1, o_2, \dots, o_k) (T'_{1i} \parallel T'_2)$, and assigning to it probability 1). Let ζ_{mi} be the projection of ζ_m on the new tree (i.e., ζ_{mi} is defined as the projection of ζ_m on the histories α' such that if α is a proper prefix of α' then $\alpha\tau(\nu o_1, o_2, \dots, o_k) (T'_{1i} \parallel T'_2)$ is a prefix of α'). We have

$$\begin{aligned} & \mathcal{P}_{MAP}(M_{\zeta_m}((\nu o_1, o_2, \dots, o_k) (T_1 \parallel T_2)), \vec{\pi}) \\ &= \\ & \mathcal{P}_{MAP}(\sum_i p_i M_{\zeta_{mi}}((\nu o_1, o_2, \dots, o_k) (T_1 \parallel T_2)), \vec{\pi}) \\ & \geq \quad (\text{by Proposition 5.7}) \\ & \sum_i p_i \mathcal{P}_{MAP}(M_{\zeta_{mi}}((\nu o_1, o_2, \dots, o_k) (T_1 \parallel T_2)), \vec{\pi}) \end{aligned}$$

In the execution tree of T_2 the above transition does not have a correspondent, but it obliges us to consider all different schedulers that are associated to the various ζ_{mi} 's for different i 's.

- (b) $(\nu o_1, o_2, \dots, o_k) (T'_1 \parallel T'_2) \xrightarrow{a} (\nu o_1, o_2, \dots, o_k) (T'_1 \parallel \mu)$ due to a transition $T'_2 \xrightarrow{a} \mu$, with a not included in $\{o_1, o_2, \dots, o_k\}$. In this case, the corresponding scheduler for T_2 must choose the same transition, i.e., $T'_2 \xrightarrow{a} \mu$.
- (c) $(\nu o_1, o_2, \dots, o_k) (T'_1 \parallel T'_2) \xrightarrow{\tau} (\nu o_1, o_2, \dots, o_k) \delta(T''_1 \parallel T''_2)$ due to the transitions $T'_1 \xrightarrow{a} \delta(T''_1)$ and $T'_2 \xrightarrow{\bar{a}} \delta(T''_2)$. In this case a must be an observable o because of the assumption that T_1 does not contain secret actions. The corresponding scheduler for T_2 must choose the transition $T'_2 \xrightarrow{\bar{a}} \delta(T''_2)$.

By considering the inequalities given by the transitions of type (a), we obtain sequences of schedulers of the form $\{\zeta_m, \zeta_{mi}, \zeta_{mij}, \zeta_{mijh}, \dots\}$, which behave like ζ_m until the node $(\nu o_1, o_2, \dots, o_k) (T'_1 \parallel T'_2)$, and correspond to paths of increasing depth in the subtree of that node. Let $p_i, q_j, r_h \dots$ the probabilities of the branches selected by $\zeta_{mi}, \zeta_{mij}, \zeta_{mijh}, \dots$ at each next choice point (which corresponds to a choice point

with the same probability in the execution of T_2). We have:

$$\begin{aligned}
& \mathcal{P}_{MAP}(M_{\zeta_m}((\nu o_1, o_2, \dots, o_k)(T_1 \parallel T_2)), \vec{\pi}) \\
& \geq \\
& \sum_i p_i \mathcal{P}_{MAP}(M_{\zeta_{mi}}((\nu o_1, o_2, \dots, o_k)(T_1 \parallel T_2)), \vec{\pi}) \\
& \geq \\
& \sum_i p_i \sum_j q_j \mathcal{P}_{MAP}(M_{\zeta_{mij}}((\nu o_1, o_2, \dots, o_k)(T_1 \parallel T_2)), \vec{\pi}) \\
& \geq \\
& \sum_i p_i \sum_j q_j \sum_h r_h \mathcal{P}_{MAP}(M_{\zeta_{mijh}}((\nu o_1, o_2, \dots, o_k)(T_1 \parallel T_2)), \vec{\pi}) \\
& \geq \\
& \dots
\end{aligned}$$

Observe now that for every i, j, h, \dots $\{\zeta_m, \zeta_{mi}, \zeta_{mij}, \zeta_{mijh}, \dots\}$ is a converging series of schedulers whose limit $\zeta_{mijh\dots}$ is isomorphic to a scheduler for T_2 , except that some of the observable transitions in T_2 may be removed due to the restriction on o_1, o_2, \dots, o_k . This removal determines a (usually non injective) mapping f on the observables. Hence Proposition 5.9 applies, and we have:

$$\begin{aligned}
& \mathcal{P}_{MAP}(M_{\zeta_m}((\nu o_1, o_2, \dots, o_k)(T_1 \parallel T_2)), \vec{\pi}) \\
& \geq \\
& \sum_i p_i \sum_j q_j \sum_h r_h \dots \mathcal{P}_{MAP}(M_{\zeta_{mijh\dots}}((\nu o_1, o_2, \dots, o_k)(T_1 \parallel T_2)), \vec{\pi}) \\
& \geq \quad (\text{by Proposition 5.9}) \\
& \sum_i p_i \sum_j q_j \sum_h r_h \dots \mathcal{P}_{MAP}(M_{\zeta_{mijh\dots}}(T_2), \vec{\pi}) \\
& \geq \\
& \sum_i p_i \sum_j q_j \sum_h r_h \dots \min_{\zeta \in \mathcal{A}} \mathcal{P}_{MAP}(M_{\zeta}(T_2), \vec{\pi})
\end{aligned}$$

Finally, observe that $\sum_i p_i = \sum_j q_j = \sum_h r_h = \dots = 1$, hence

$$\mathcal{P}_{MAP}(M_{\zeta_m}((\nu o_1, o_2, \dots, o_k)(T_1 \parallel T_2)), \vec{\pi}) \geq \min_{\zeta \in \mathcal{A}} \mathcal{P}_{MAP}(M_{\zeta}(T_2), \vec{\pi})$$

which concludes the proof. □

Unfortunately the safety property does not hold for the secret choice. The following is a counterexample.

Example 6.3. Let $Sec = \{s_1, s_2\}$ and assume that \mathcal{S} does not contain the empty sequence. Let $T = o_1.0 \mid\!\!\! \perp\!\!\!\perp o_2.0$. For all sequences $s, s' \in \mathcal{S}$ we have $p(o_1|s) = p(o_1|s')$ and $p(o_2|s) = p(o_1|s')$. Hence, by Proposition 5.10 we have $Pt_{MAP}(T, \vec{\pi}) = 1 - \max_s \pi_s$.

Consider now $T' = s_1.T \sqcup s_2.T$. Let us define a scheduler that, if the secret starts with s_1 selects o_1 , and if the secret starts with s_2 selects o_2 . We note that, under this scheduler, $p(o_1|s_1s) = p(o_2|s_2s) = 1$ while $p(o_1|s_2s) = p(o_2|s_1s) = 0$. Therefore $Pt_{MAP}(T', \vec{\pi}) = 1 - p_1 - p_2$ where p_1 and p_2 are the maximum probabilities of the secrets of the form s_1s and s_2s , respectively. Note now that either $\max_s \pi_s = p_1$ or $\max_s \pi_s = p_2$ because of the assumption that \mathcal{S} does not contain the empty sequence. Let $\vec{\pi}$ be such that both p_1 and p_2 are positive. Then $1 - p_1 - p_2 < 1 - \max_s \pi_s$, hence $Pt_{MAP}(T', \vec{\pi}) < Pt_{MAP}(T, \vec{\pi})$.

The reason why we need the condition (i) in Definition 6.1 for the parallel operator is analogous to the case of secret choice. The following is a counterexample.

Example 6.4. Let Sec and \mathcal{S} be as in Example 6.3. Define $T_1 = s_1.0 \sqcup s_2.0$ and $T_2 = o_1.0 \sqcup o_2.0$. Again, we have $Pt_{MAP}(T_2, \vec{\pi}) = 1 - \max_s \pi_s$. Consider now the term $T_1 \parallel T_2$ and define a scheduler that first executes an action s in T_1 and then, if s is s_1 , it selects o_1 , while if s is s_2 , it selects o_2 . The rest proceeds like in Example 6.3, where $T' = T_1 \parallel T_2$ and $T = T_2$.

The reason why we need the condition (ii) in Definition 6.1 is that without it the parallel operator may create different interleavings, thus increasing the possibility of an adversary discovering the secrets. The following is a counterexample.

Example 6.5. Let Sec and \mathcal{S} be as in Example 6.3. Define $T_1 = o.0$ and $T_2 = s_1.(o_1.0 \oplus_{.5} o_2.0) \sqcup s_2.(o_1.0 \oplus_{.5} o_2.0)$. It is easy to see that $Pt_{MAP}(T_2, \vec{\pi}) = 1 - \max_s \pi_s$. Consider the term $T_1 \parallel T_2$ and define a scheduler that first executes an action s in T_2 and then, if s is s_1 , it selects first T_1 and then the continuation of T_2 , while if s is s_2 , it selects first the continuation of T_2 and then T_1 . Hence, under this scheduler, $p(o o_1|s_1s) = p(o o_2|s_1s) = .5$ and also $p(o_1 o|s_2s) = p(o_2 o|s_2s) = .5$ while $p(o o_1|s_2s) = p(o o_2|s_2s) = 0$ and $p(o_1 o|s_1s) = p(o_2 o|s_1s) = 0$. Therefore $Pt_{MAP}(T, \vec{\pi}) = 1 - p_1 - p_2$ where p_1 and p_2 are the maximum probabilities of the secrets of the form s_1s and s_2s , respectively. Following the same reasoning as in Example 6.3, we have that $Pt_{MAP}(T', \vec{\pi}) < Pt_{MAP}(T, \vec{\pi})$.

7. A case study: the Dining Cryptographers

In this section we consider the Dining Cryptographers (DC) protocol proposed by Chaum (Chaum 1988), we show how to describe it in CCS_p , and we apply the results of the previous section to obtain a generalization of Chaum's strong anonymity result.

In its most general formulation, the DC consists of a multigraph where one of the nodes (cryptographers) may be secretly designated to pay for the dinner. The cryptographers would like to find out whether there is a payer or not, but without either discovering the identity of the payer, nor revealing it to an external observer. The problem can be solved as follows: we put on each edge a probabilistic coin, with two possible, mutually exclusive results, 0 or 1. The coins are tossed, and each cryptographer computes the binary sum of all (the results of) the adjacent coins. Furthermore, it adds 1 if it is designated to be the payer. Finally, all the cryptographers declare their result.

It is easy to see that this protocol solves the problem of figuring out the existence of a

$$\begin{aligned}
Crypt_i &= c_{i,i_1}(x_1) \cdot \dots \cdot c_{i,i_k}(x_k) \cdot pay_i(x) \cdot \bar{d}_i\langle x_1 + \dots + x_k + x \rangle \\
Coin_h &= \bar{c}_{\ell,h}\langle 0 \rangle \cdot \bar{c}_{r,h}\langle 0 \rangle \cdot 0 \oplus_{p_h} \bar{c}_{\ell,h}\langle 1 \rangle \cdot \bar{c}_{r,h}\langle 1 \rangle \cdot 0 \\
Collect &= d_1(y_1) \cdot d_2(y_2) \cdot \dots \cdot d_n(y_n) \cdot \overline{out}\langle y_1, y_2, \dots, y_n \rangle \\
DC &= (\nu \vec{c})(\nu \vec{d})(\prod_i Crypt_i \parallel \prod_h Coin_h \parallel Collect)
\end{aligned}$$

Table 2. The dining cryptographers protocol expressed in CCS_p .

payer: the binary sum of all declarations is 1 if and only if there is a payer, because all the coins are counted twice, so their contribution to the total sum is 0.

The property we are interested in, however, is the anonymity of the system. Chaum proved that the DC is strongly anonymous if all the coins are fair, i.e., they give 0 and 1 with equal probability, and the multigraph is connected, namely there is a path between each pair of nodes. To state formally the property, let us denote by s the secret identity of the payer, and by o the collection of the declarations of the cryptographers.

Theorem 7.1. (Chaum 1988) If the multigraph is connected, and the coins are fair, then DC is strongly anonymous, namely for every s and o , $p(s|o) = p(s)$ holds.

We are now going to show how to express the DC in CCS_p . We start by introducing a notation for value-passing in CCS_p , following standard lines. The new notation is just syntactic sugar, in the sense that it is expressed in terms of the constructs of CCS_p .

$$\begin{aligned}
Input \quad c(x).T &= \bigsqcup_v c_v.T[v/x] \\
Output \quad \bar{c}\langle v \rangle &= \bar{c}_v
\end{aligned}$$

The protocol, represented in Table 2, is defined as the parallel composition of the cryptographers processes $Crypt_i$, of the coin processes $Coin_h$, and of a process $Collect$ whose purpose is to collect all the declarations of the cryptographers, and output them in the form of a tuple. The reason for using this process $Collect$ is that in the original Chaum protocol all cryptographers are supposed to make their declaration at the same time. This is important because otherwise the schedule could reveal the identity of the payer by scheduling his declaration first, for example. However in CCS_p concurrency is resolved by interleaving, and it is not possible to enforce the simultaneity of a set of actions (with the exception of a pair of complementary actions in a synchronisation step). Hence we need to simulate the simultaneous declarations by means of a single process ($Collect$) that collects the results into a tuple and then declares the tuple in a single step, and by internalizing the interleavings corresponding to the possible orders in which the results are transmitted by the cryptographers to $Collect$. Since these interleavings are internalized (i.e. they do not produce any observable action), their order does not matter: they are all equivalent (namely, invisible) from the point of view of the observer. In this protocol, the secret actions are pay_i . All the others are observable actions.

Each coin communicates with two cryptographers. $c_{i,h}$ represents the communication

channel between $Coin_h$ and $Crypt_i$ if h is indeed the index of a coin, otherwise it represents a communication channel “with the environment”. We will call the latter *external*. In the original definition of the DC there are no external channels, we have added them to prove a generalization of Chaum’s result. They could be interpreted as a way for the environment to influence the computation of the cryptographers and hence test the system, for the purpose of discovering the secret.

We are now ready to state our generalization of Chaum’s result:

Theorem 7.2. A DC is strongly anonymous if it has a spanning tree consisting of fair coins only.

Proof. Consider the term DC in Table 2. Remove all the coins that do not belong to the spanning tree, and the corresponding restriction operators. Let T be the process term obtained this way. Let \mathcal{A} be the class of schedulers which select the value 0 for all the external channels. Since all the remaining coins are fair, this situation corresponds to the original formulation of Chaum and so we can apply Chaum’s result (Theorem 7.1) and Proposition 5.11 to conclude that all the rows of the matrix M are the same and hence, by Proposition 5.10, $\mathcal{P}_{MAP}(M, \vec{\pi}) = 1 - \max_i \pi_i$.

Consider now one of the removed coins, h , and assume, without loss of generality, that $c_{\ell,h}(x)$, $c_{r,h}(x)$ are the first actions in the definitions of $Crypt_\ell$ and $Crypt_r$. Consider the class of schedulers \mathcal{B} that selects value 1 for x in these channels. The matrix M' that we obtain is isomorphic to M : the only difference is that each column o is now mapped to a column $o + w$, where w is a tuple that has 1 in the ℓ and r positions, and 0 in all other positions, and $+$ represents the componentwise binary sum. Since this map is a bijection, we can apply Proposition 5.9 in both directions and derive that $\mathcal{P}_{MAP}(M', \vec{\pi}) = 1 - \max_i \pi_i$.

By repeating the same reasoning on each of the removed coins, we can conclude that $Pt_{MAP}(T, \vec{\pi}) = 1 - \max_i \pi_i$ for any scheduler ζ of T .

Consider now the term T' obtained from T by adding back the coin h :

$$T' = (\nu c_{\ell,h} c_{r,h})(Coin_h \parallel T)$$

By applying Theorem 6.2 we can deduce that

$$Pt_{MAP}(T', \vec{\pi}) \geq Pt_{MAP}(T, \vec{\pi})$$

By repeating this reasoning, we can add back all the coins, one by one, and obtain the original DC . Hence we can conclude that

$$Pt_{MAP}(DC, \vec{\pi}) \geq Pt_{MAP}(T, \vec{\pi}) = 1 - \max_i \pi_i$$

and, since $1 - \max_i \pi_i$ is the maximum probability of error,

$$Pt_{MAP}(DC, \vec{\pi}) = 1 - \max_i \pi_i$$

which concludes the proof. \square

Interestingly, also the other direction of Theorem 7.2 holds. We report this result for

completeness, however we have proved it by using traditional methods, not by applying the compositional methods of Section 6.

Theorem 7.3. A DC is strongly anonymous only if it has a spanning tree consisting of fair coins only.

Proof. By contradiction. Let G be the multigraph associated to the DC and let n be the number of vertices in G . Assume that G does not have a spanning tree consisting only of fair coins. Then it is possible to split G in two non-empty subgraphs, G_1 and G_2 , such that all the edges between G_1 and G_2 are unfair. Let (c_1, c_2, \dots, c_m) be the vector of coins corresponding to these edges. Since G is connected, we have that $m \geq 1$.

Let a_1 be a vertex in G_1 and a_2 be a vertex in G_2 . By our assumption of strong anonymity, for every observable o (which, we recall, is a vector of bits representing the declarations of the cryptographers) we have

$$p(o \mid a_1) = p(o \mid a_2) \quad (1)$$

Here a_1 , resp. a_2 , represents the event that the cryptographer a_1 , resp. a_2 , is the payer.

Observe now that, if w is a binary vector of dimension n containing 1 exactly twice, in correspondence of a_1 and a_2 , then $p(o \mid a_1) = p(o + w \mid a_2)$, where $o + w$ is the vector resulting from the component wise binary sum of o and w . This is because by adding 1 to their declarations, we invert the payer/non payer behavior of a_1 and a_2 . Thus by adding w to the declarations in the case in which a_2 is the payer (and a_1 is a non-payer) we obtain the same result as the case in which a_1 is the payer (and a_2 is a non-payer). Hence (1) becomes

$$p(o + w \mid a_2) = p(o \mid a_2) \quad (2)$$

Let d be the binary sum of all the elements of o in G_1 , and d' be the binary sum of all the elements of $o + w$ in G_1 . Since in G_1 w contains 1 exactly once, we have $d' = d + 1$. Hence (2), being valid for all o 's, implies

$$p(d + 1 \mid a_2) = p(d \mid a_2) \quad (3)$$

Because of the way o , and hence d , are calculated, and since the contribution of the edges internal to G_1 is 0, and a_2 (the payer) is not in G_1 , we have that

$$d = \sum_{i=1}^m c_i$$

from which, together with (3), and the fact that the coins are independent from the choice of the payer, we derive

$$p\left(\sum_{i=1}^m c_i = 0\right) = p\left(\sum_{i=1}^m c_i = 1\right) = 1/2 \quad (4)$$

The last step is to prove that $p(\sum_{i=1}^m c_i = 0) = 1/2$ implies that one of the c_i 's is fair, which will give us a contradiction. We prove this by induction on m . The property obviously holds for $m = 1$. Let us now assume that we have proved it for the

vector $(c_1, c_2, \dots, c_{m-1})$. Observe that $p(\sum_{i=1}^m c_i = 0) = p(\sum_{i=1}^{m-1} c_i = 0)p(c_m = 0) + p(\sum_{i=1}^{m-1} c_i = 1)p(c_m = 1)$. From (4) we derive

$$p(\sum_{i=1}^{m-1} c_i = 0)p(c_m = 0) + p(\sum_{i=1}^{m-1} c_i = 1)p(c_m = 1) = 1/2 \quad (5)$$

Now, it is easy to see that (5) has only two solutions: one in which $p(c_m = 0) = 1/2$, and one in which $p(\sum_{i=1}^{m-1} c_i = 1) = 1/2$. In the first case we are done, in the second case we apply the induction hypothesis. \square

8. Related work

In the field of information flow there have been various works (McLean 1990, James W. Gray III 1991, Lowe 2002, Clark, Hunt & Malacaria 2001, Clark, Hunt & Malacaria 2005, Malacaria 2007, Malacaria & Chen 2008, Heusser & Malacaria 2009, Smith 2009, Andrés, Palamidessi, van Rossum & Smith 2010a, Alvim, Andrés & Palamidessi 2010, Boreale, Pampaloni & Paolini 2011) in which the *high information* and the *low information* are seen as the input and output respectively of a (noisy) channel. Information leakage is formalized in this setting as the channel mutual information or the channel capacity. The idea is that the leakage represents the difference between the a priori uncertainty about the (secret) high information, and the a posteriori uncertainty, after the low information has become publically known. The uncertainty is expressed in terms of entropy, and there are various alternative notions depending on the notion of attack that one wishes to model, as discussed in (Köpf & Basin 2007). Most of the above approaches are based either on Shannon entropy or on the Rényi min entropy.

Channel capacity has been also used in relation to anonymity in (Moskowitz, Newman, Crepeau & Miller 2003b, Moskowitz, Newman & Syverson 2003a). These works propose a method to create covert communication by means of non-perfect anonymity.

A related line of work is (Serjantov & Danezis 2002, Díaz, Seys, Claessens & Preneel 2002), where the main idea is to express the lack of (probabilistic) information in terms of entropy.

A different information-theoretic approach is taken in (Clarkson, Myers & Schneider 2009). In this paper, the authors define information leakage as the difference between the a priori accuracy of the guess of the attacker, and the a posteriori one, after the attacker has made his observation. The accuracy of the guess is defined as the Kullback-Leibler distance between the *belief* (which is a weight attributed by the attacker to each input hypothesis) and the true distribution on the hypotheses. This approach, that was Shannon-based in (Clarkson et al. 2009), was later applied by Hamadou et al. (Hamadou, Palamidessi & Sassone 2010) also to the case of the Rényi min entropy.

The problem of preservation of information protection under program composition was considered also by McIver et al (McIver et al. 2010). In that paper, the author define an order \preceq on specifications based on Bayes Risk, and they identify a compositional subset of it: a refinement order \sqsubseteq such that $S \sqsubseteq I$ implies $C[S] \preceq C[I]$ for all contexts C . They also show that \sqsubseteq is the *compositional closure* of \preceq , in the sense that $S \not\sqsubseteq I$ only when $C[S] \not\preceq C[I]$ for some C . Finally, they prove that \sqsubseteq is sound for other three,

competing notions of elementary test and that therefore Bayes-Risk testing, with context, is maximally discriminating among them.

Desharnais et al. (Desharnais, Jagadeesan, Gupta & Panangaden 2002) defined a notion of metric between probabilistic processes and proved that the Shannon capacity associated to a protocol associated to a process is continuous with respect to this metric.

Deng et al. (Deng, Pang & Wu 2006) consider a probabilistic calculus similar to CCS_p , and define a relation between traces based on the Kullback-Leibler divergence. They show that certain constructs of their calculus preserve the relation, in the sense that they do not increase the divergence.

The analysis of quantitative information flow in concurrent programs has also been investigated in purely probabilistic (i.e. non information-theoretic) frameworks. For instance, (Garcia, van Rossum & Sokolova 2007) proposed to verify strong probabilistic anonymity by checking the sufficient condition that if two states differ only for the choice of the secret value, then the probabilistic automata rooted in those two states are isomorphic. This idea was further developed by (Andrés, Palamidessi, van Rossum & Sokolova 2010b).

9. Conclusion, discussion, and future work

In this paper we have proposed to use the notion of Bayes risk to measure the degree of protection offered by an information-hiding protocol. We have investigated CCS_p constructs that are safe, i.e., that are guaranteed not to decrease the protection. Then we have applied these results to strengthen a result of Chaum: the dining cryptographers are strongly anonymous if and only if they have a spanning tree of fair coins.

We recall that the Bayes risk represents the probability of error of an adversary who knows *the exact prior probability distribution*, and therefore he applies the MAP rule exactly. In case the adversary does not know the exact prior, he can still apply (an approximation of) the MAP rule of course, using for instance the uniform distribution, or his best bet, as the prior. Since the MAP rule is optimal, the probability of error in the approximate case is always greater than or equal to the Bayes risk. Hence the compositional method developed in this paper is still useful to compute a lower bound on the degree of protection.

One natural question is whether we could obtain a better (more precise) bound in the case we know for sure that the adversary is going to use a certain distribution as prior. Typically, if the adversary does not know anything about the prior distribution, he will use the uniform prior. This is equivalent to applying the so-called ML rule, which prescribes the choice of the s which has *Maximum Likelihood* (for a given $o \in \mathcal{O}$), namely the s for which $p(o|s)$ is maximum[‡]. The corresponding probability of error $\mathcal{P}_{ML}(M, \vec{\pi})$ can be characterised as follows (as an immediate consequence of Definition 5.2 and of the Bayes theorem).

[‡] The name comes from the fact that $p(o|s)$ is called the *likelihood* of s given o .

$$\mathcal{P}_{ML}(M, \vec{\pi}) = 1 - \sum_{\mathcal{O}} p(o|s_o) \pi_{s_o}$$

where $p(o|s_o) = \max_s(p(o|s))$.

However, the methods developed in this paper cannot be applied to compute a better lower bound for $\mathcal{P}_{ML}(M, \vec{\pi})$, because Proposition 5.9, which is crucial for the compositionally results, does not hold for $\mathcal{P}_{ML}(M, \vec{\pi})$. We leave the problem of developing a compositional method for computing the risk of ML-based attacks as a topic for future work.

Another problem that we would like to investigate in the future is the extension our results to other constructs of the language, and in particular to a more liberal type of parallel composition. This is not possible in the present setting, as the examples after Theorem 6.2 show. The problem is related to the scheduler: the standard notion of scheduler is too powerful and can leak secrets, by depending on the secret choices that have been made in the past. All the examples after Theorem 6.2 are based on this kind of problem. In (Chatzikokolakis & Palamidessi 2010), we have studied the problem and we came out with a language-based solution to restrict the power of the scheduler. We are planning to investigate whether such approach could be exploited here to guarantee the safety of more constructs.

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